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ABSTRACT: This text examines some of the difficulties arising from
any attempt to conceive of repetition. These difficulties are ex-
plored through a brief commentary on a proposition concerning
the unrepeatability of thought that Johann Georg Hamann intro-
duces in his correspondence— on two occasions.
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Repetition
TOM VANDEPUTTE
Is there a concept of repetition? Can repetition be defined
clearly, can it be delimited without ambiguity? Can this
word, ‘repetition’, be made to correspond to a concept that
is both univocal and stable — a concept that can be iter-
ated again, at another time or place, without difference or
alteration? Is there, in other words, a concept of repetition
that is repeatable? Does such a concept not already presup-
pose an understanding ofwhat it is yet to grasp?Does it not
anticipate themeaning of a word it is yet to define?Has the
concept of repetition — and with it every concept — not
already proposed that repetition is indeed possible? And
has it not already determined this repetition as a repetition
of a certain kind — a repetition whose content remains
stable and constant, a repetition of one and the same thing,
a repetition without alteration? Has one, then, not already
spoken of repetition before one has even begun to define
it?
These questions form the background to a remark that
is found in the writings of Johann Georg Hamann — a
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contemporary and close friend of Kant, whose critique of
pure reason was the most important target of Hamann’s
later polemical writings. In an important passage from a
letter of 1769 included in the third volume of his collected
writings, we read:
There are thoughts that one has only once in one’s
life and which one is not able to produce again
[Gedanken […] die man nur Einmal in seinem Leben
hat, und nicht Meister ist wieder hervorzubringen].1
As an astute reader of Hamann has noted, it is however
this thought— precisely this thought— that occurs again
in the fifth volume of his collected writings, in a letter
composed several years later, in 1773.2 Here we read:
It seems tome that there are certain thoughtswe are
only able to have once in our life [daß wir gewißer
Gedanken nur einmal in unserem Leben fähig sind].3
Es giebt Gedanken, we read, gewiße Gedanken, certain
thoughts — but exactly which thoughts are referred to
here? Is this merely a reflection on some thoughts and
not others, on a specific class of thoughts that only occur
once? Es giebt Gedanken die man nur Einmal in seinem
Leben hat, Hamann writes. What if this remark is read as
a reflection on a much broader class of thoughts than it
seems to describe at first sight— on the thoughts of finite,
human beings as distinct from divine thought? Es giebt
1 Johann Georg Hamann, Schriften, ed. Friedrich Roth, 7 vols (Berlin:
Riemer, 1821–25), iii (1822), p. 392.
2 Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter elektronisk version 1.8.1,
ed. by Karsten Kynde (Copenhagen: Søren Kierkegaard Forsknings-
centeret, 2014), ‘Journaler og papirer’, DD:28 <http://www.sks.dk/
DD/txt.xml> [accessed 16 December 2018].
3 Hamann, Schriften, v (1824), p. 25.
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Gedanken die man nur Einmal in seinemLeben hat, und nicht
Meister ist wieder hervorzubringen. That certain thoughts
occur only once, thus, does not seem to be an accident: we
think these thoughts only once, writes Hamann, because
we are not able to think them again. We are not able to
think them again because we do not have absolute mastery
over our thoughts; we do not relate to them as a master
relates to a servant who can be commanded at will. There
would seem to be a force that inheres in these thoughts
that impedes our ability to master them, to produce them
again at our own will, a dynamic by virtue of which such
thoughts are unrepeatable— at least for finite beings.
How this unrepeatability is to be understood is not
specified in the remark. That is to say, it is not stated here.
The remark does not say anything about this impossibility
of repeating certain thoughts; it does, however, engage in
a repetition itself. Yet it is not immediately clear whether
this repetition illustrates the assertion, whether it demon-
strates it ‘silently’— just asDiogenes countered the Eleatic
denial of motion by simply pacing back and forth a few
times. At first, it may seem as if Hamann’s repeated itera-
tion of this thought does precisely the opposite of what it
states — if, at least, the statement is taken to refer to the
unrepeatability of the thoughts of finite, human beings as
opposed to those of a divine being. Is the thought that is
put forward here not the same as before? Is it not one and
the same thought that is produced here once again? The
fact that the second iteration does not use the exact same
words only seems to support this. Does Hamann not say
the same thing— only in different words?The differences
between the two iterations — the substitution of man by
uns, of es giebt Gedanken by gewisse Gedanken—can easily
be understood as paraphrasing one and the same thought.
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The same can be said about the replacement of Gedanken
haben und hervorbringen in the first iteration andGedanken
fähig sein in the second. Is this not merely a paraphrase, a
summary with the same semantic content?
Indeed, the comical effect of the two sentences de-
pends precisely on the fact that they canbe read as repeated
iterations of one and the same thought— the thought that
certain thoughts cannot be repeated. If these two sentences
would not appear as iterations of the same thought, they
would not appear to contradict what they state. And yet
at the same time, the repetition complicates the possibil-
ity to understand the two remarks as repetitions of one
and the same thought. When this same thought is iterated
once again, its meaning seems to have shifted. Not that
one meaning would have been replaced by another; the
repetition of the thought that certain thoughts cannot be
repeated rather calls into question whether it means any-
thing at all. Once it is repeated, what is meant in the first
iteration no longer seems to be quite so stable: insofar as
it appears to contradict itself, it is, suddenly, permeated by
the possibility of irony.
This irony is difficult to curtail. Not only is it no longer
certain what is meant, it is also uncertain whether it is even
possible to decide with certainty whether there is an irony
here at all.The possibility of irony first opens up when one
perceives a contradiction between the semantic content of
the sentence and its repetition. But is it even certain that
there is a contradiction? Is it certain that this thought is
one of those thoughts that the remark refers to? And is it
even certain that this is a repetition of one and the same
thought? Or does Hamann, in the second letter, speak of
a thought that is quite different from the first? Is it merely
an accident that the same words — Gedanken, Einmal —
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appear here once more? Even the instability of the remark
is difficult to determine in a stable way.
The repetition of this thought, of one and the same
thought, does not leave it intact. It is not that the alteration
of meaning affects only the second iteration; it is not that
the second iteration means something different because it
has already been said while the first iteration still means
the same. The alteration does not only affect the second
iteration; it does not leave themeaning of the first iteration
intact. What is meant in the first iteration dissolves. It
becomes impossible to read this iteration if it is not already
read in relation to its double. Likewise, the second iteration
has no stable meaning on its own. It becomes possible to
read only in relation to the first. The repetition thus not
only destabilizes the meaning of the thought but also its
unity. It turns out not to be possible to speak of one and
the same thought that would be stated twice; the thought
—what is supposedlymeant bywhat is said— is never one
but already two. It is not a repeated thought, but a thought
that is always already a repetition. Hamann’s remark thus
turns out to be far from a statement on the unicity of
thought, a simple assertion of its irreducible Einmaligkeit.
At the same time as it speaks of the unrepeatability of
thought, it conjures up a thought that is constituted only
in and as repetition.
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